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Abstract 
Whether currency devaluation helps economic growth is an empirically open question. Despite its policy-implications, 
the issue has received relatively scant econometric attention. Since the results are specific to the sample, model, and 
techniques employed, country-specific studies have received renewed interest. Coexistence of successive currency 
devaluations and a booming economy makes India a unique case-study. Using latest data and the bounds-testing 
approach to cointegration and error-correction modeling, this paper finds that rupee's devaluation is expansionary in 
India.
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1.  Introduction 
Since the launch of economic reforms in 1991, the Indian rupee has undergone a 
series of devaluations and is getting weaker in recent times. Should the Reserve Bank of 
India  (RBI)  curb  this  decline,  or  let  the  rupee  fall  further?  The  answer  depends  on 
whether currency devaluation is expansionary in India. While there is no denying the fact 
that currency devaluation and growth have coexisted in India, it is not clear how the 
rupee’s devaluation may have impacted her growth. Within the Keynesian framework, 
currency  devaluation  boosts  economic  growth  by  promoting  net  exports,  aggregate 
demand,  and  output  through  the  multiplier  effect.  However,  this  is  only  a  necessary 
condition  for  devaluation  to  be  expansionary,  not  a  sufficient  one.  For  example,  by 
making imported inputs more expensive, devaluation can contract the aggregate supply 
curve, and cause inflation.
1  For the same reason, it can also lower investment, a key 
component of aggregate demand. Moreover, if it is a crisis-driven devaluation, it could 
damage  the  country’s  reputation  and  lead  to  a  flight  of  capital  and  destabilize  the 
economy.
2  Thus,  the  net  effect  on  output  is  theoretically  ambiguous  and  remains  an 
empirically open question.  
The state-contingent finding is important in view of the timing of the rupee’s 
devaluation in 1991. The country’s foreign exchange reserves had fallen to record low 
levels and a crisis was eminent.
3 Should the rupee have been devalued then? Or, given 
the unprecedented boom, now is a better time to devalue the rupee? In this paper, we test 
the contractionary devaluation hypothesis for India using the bounds-testing approach to 
cointegration and error-correction modeling, proposed by Pesaran, et al., 2001 – a recent 
technique  requiring  no  unit-root  testing  and  is  also  deemed  appropriate  for  small 
samples.
4 The exchange rate sensitivity of real output, being of main interest, is studied 
using a reduced-form model. To complement the findings, we also check: (i) whether a 
nominal devaluation of the rupee leads to its real devaluation, and subsequently, (ii) if a 
real devaluation of the rupee improves India’ trade balance. To this end, a review of the 
literature is provided in Section 2, followed by an outline of the models and methodology 
in Section 3. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4; Section 5 concludes. Data, 
definitions, and sources are cited in the Appendix. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
A  country  under  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  could  boost  her  exports  by 
devaluing her currency. Devaluation, however, makes her imports more expensive, and 
results in inflationary side effects. If her exports sector is heavily reliant on imported 
inputs, then these side effects will cause cost-push inflation in the export sector as well, 
                                                 
1  This  is  why  IMF  packages  prescribing  currency  devaluation  (expenditure-switching  policies)  often 
required tightening of fiscal and monetary policies (expenditure reducing policies).  
2 Rajan and Shen (2001) find that larger the level of short-term indebtedness, ceteris paribus, the stronger 
the contractionary effect of a currency devaluation.   
3 India’s foreign exchange reserves had fallen to less than three weeks of import in 1990. Also easing the 
quantitative controls on imports (in 1991 liberalization package) implied that the trade balance had to be 
boosted through alternative measures such as devaluation of the rupee. Das and Pant (1997) find that rupee 
was actually overvalued in the 1980s, necessitating its devaluation.    
4 Since most of the older studies did not test for the staitionarity of the data, they likely suffered from the 
problem of spurious regressions. Moreover, recent studies that did test for stationarity employed different 
unit-root tests with varying explanatory power and outcomes.     2 
and diminish the competitiveness of her exports.
5 To ensure that devaluation is not self-
defeating, it is important that a nominal devaluation of the currency leads to its  real 
devaluation  as  well.  Studies  such  as  Vaubel  (1976),  Bruno  (1978),  Donovan  (1981), 
Morgan and Davis (1982) show that nominal devaluation leads to real devaluation at least 
in the short to medium term. In a study of 21 African countries, Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Gelan (2006) found that the short-run effects lasted into the long-run only in 3 cases, viz. 
Burundi, Kenya, and Seychelles. In a previous study of 19 LDCs, Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Miteza  (2002)  reported  favorable  long-run  effects  in  as  many  as  16  cases,  including 
India. However, the error-correction term was  not only insignificant but also had the 
wrong sign. Previously Marwah (1970) had found that rupee’s devaluation in 1966 was 
indeed inflationary.   
By making exports cheaper and imports dearer, real devaluation helps boost the 
country’s net exports, and therefore, aggregate demand, output, employment, and real 
income. However, trade balance may not improve unless the Marshall-Lerner condition 
(henceforth ML condition) is met.
6  Since the short-run elasticities are usually smaller 
than their long-run counterparts, the ML condition may not hold in the short-run.
7 There 
are also reasons why demand may actually contract: Devaluation typically raises profits 
in the export and import-competing sectors. Other sectors, particularly those relying on 
imported  inputs  suffer  from  declining  investment.  As  mentioned  earlier,  inflation 
becomes  a  necessary  by-product  of  devaluation  that  erodes  the  purchasing  power  of 
wage-earners who tend to have a higher marginal propensity to consume than the profit-
earners.
8 If part of this increased profit accrues to the rest of the world, there is a leakage 
from the multiplier process. Additionally, there is an adverse real balance effect as real 
wealth drops (due to inflation), resulting in a further drop in spending. Moreover, if bulk 
of  the  foreign-debt  is  in  foreign-currency  (as  was  the  case  for  Mexico  in  1994),  the 
country’s debt-burden worsens, and drains-off resources from alternatives uses.  
Devaluation can be contractionary on the supply side as well. Aggregate supply 
contracts  because imported inputs  get  costlier  (Krugman and Taylor, 1978;  Edwards, 
1986; and van Wijnbergen, 1986) following a real devaluation. Given the inflationary 
environment, factor prices (including wages and interest rates) rise and further reduce the 
aggregate supply.   
Whether devaluation is contractionary or expansionary depends on the relative 
shifts of the aggregate demand and supply curves. Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2003) 
review the literature along the four strands it has taken: (i) The before-after literature 
compares output growth before and after devaluation (Cooper, 1971); (ii) The control-
                                                 
5  Sen  and  Mukhopadhyay  (1994)  note  that  in  India  imports  mostly  comprised  of  raw  materials  and 
intermediate inputs and therefore have a critical bearing on output growth.  
6 The net-exports improve if the sum of the export- and import-demand elasticities add up to more than one 
– a condition known as the Marshall-Lerner Condition.   
7 In the early 1970s, the ML condition was met, $ was devalued yet the US trade balance continued to 
deteriorate. Magee (1973) explained this in terms of the J-Curve effect. For more on J-Curve, see Bahmani-
Oskooee and Ratha (2004).  
8 Rajan and Shen (2001) find weak support in favor of the hypothesis that a country with a lower per capita 
income is more likely to suffer from a contractionary devaluation. Berry (1974) find no strong evidence of 
economic growth aggravating income distribution. Bahmani-Oskooee (1996) tests a version of the Kuznet’s 
hypothesis that includes an exchange rate variable in the regression and finds evidence that devaluation 
worsens income distribution.    3 
group approach compares output growth in the devaluing countries with the same in a set 
of non-valuing countries, called the control-group (Donovan, 1981; Edwards, 1989); (iii) 
The macro-simulation approach involves theoretical models and/or simulations involving 
different transmission mechanisms (Krugman and Taylor, 1978;  Barbone and Rivera-
Batiz,  1987;  Gylafson  and  Schmid,  1983;  van Wijnbergen,  1986;  Agenor,  1991;  and 
Taye,  1999);  and  (iv)  The  econometric  approach  estimating  the  effects  of  different 
stabilization policies (Sheehey, 1986; Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee, 1997). 
While there is no consensus yet, there is ample evidence in favor of devaluation 
being (i) contractionary in Latin American countries, and (ii) expansionary in pre-1997 
Asia, and (iii) contractionary in post-1997 Asia. Is it because of speculative attacks? Kim 
and  Ying  (2007)  comment  that  with  financial  liberalization  and  improvement  in 
information  technology,  devaluation  may  be  more  contractionary  than  before  as  it 
worsens the balance of payments of countries with heavy foreign currency liabilities. 
Also there is an adverse effect on the country’s reputation impairing her ability to raise 
foreign capital. Therefore, they note, devaluation can be contractionary in post-1997 East 
Asia just as well as in Mexico and Chile.  
India  was  one  of  the  countries  studied  by  Gylfason  and  Schmid  (1983)  and 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1998) but the results were neutral, meaning devaluation had no long-
run implications for growth. Given that devaluation and growth have coexisted in India, 
at least since the 1990s, should we anticipate another round of devaluation?  Using cross-
section  data  from  23  LDCs,  Agenor  (1991)  shows  that  anticipated  devaluation  is 
contractionary whereas unanticipated devaluation is expansionary. From his case study of 
Turkey (1960-1990), Domac (1997) finds no evidence of contractionary devaluation but 
confirms  the  expansionary  effect  of  unanticipated  devaluation.  Since  multi-country 
studies tend to overlook features specific to each country, country-specific studies have 
received renewed interest. The present study adds to this growing literature.
9 
 
3. Outline of the Models and Methodology 
In the absence of money illusion, a nominal devaluation is effective only if it also 
leads to a real devaluation. In order to find whether the latter is true, we estimate a simple 
model: 
 
ln REERt = a + b ln NEERt + 1t … (1) 
 
where ln stands for natural logarithm,  REERt is the real effective exchange rate, and 
NEERt is the nominal effective exchange rate of the rupee. 
   Whether  a real  devaluation  improves  the trade  balance, can be tested  using a 
version of the trade balance model proposed by Rose and Yellen (1989) and extensively 
used in the literature:  
 
ln TBt = a + b ln REERt + c ln Yt + d ln YFt + 2t … (2) 
                                                 
9See for example, Solimano (1986) for Chile, Roca and Priale (1987) for Peru, Kamin and Rogers (1997) 
for Mexico, and Taye (1999) for Ethiopia find evidence of contractionary devaluation whereas Taylor and 
Rosenweig (1984) for Thailand, and Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee (1997) for Korea point to the contrary. 
Upadhyaya (1999) finds that devaluation is contractionary in Pakistan and Thailand but has no long-run 
effects in India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Philippines.    4 
where TBt is the trade balance defined as the ratio of exports to imports, such that an 
increase  implies  an  improvement  of  the  trade  balance.
10  Yt  and  YFt  are  indices  of 
domestic and world income, respectively. The coefficient of REER, b, is of key interest 
here.  For  real  depreciation  of  the  rupee  to  improve  Indian  trade  balance,  it  must  be 
negative and significant.  
Finally, following previous research, we estimate a reduced form model where 




ln Yt = a + b ln Gt+ c ln Mt + d ln REERt+ 3t  …(3) 
 
where Yt is the real GDP, Gt is the real government expenditure, Mt is the real M2 money 
supply, and REERt is the rupee’s real effective exchange rate, all set in index form. While 
the coefficients of fiscal and monetary variables (i.e., b and c) are expected to be positive, 
d can be positive or negative, depending on whether devaluation is  contractionary or 
expansionary.  
The bounds testing approach to cointegration, proposed by Pesaran et. al. (2001), 
involves no unit root testing, and therefore, was chosen to detect both the long-run and 
the short-run dynamics. For each of the long-run equations (1) through (3) noted above, 
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where  a  linear  combination  of  the  lagged-level  variables  approximates  the  error-
correction term in each case. 
                                                 
10 Note that this ratio is unit free, and is the nominal as well as real trade balance. Since it cannot  be 
negative, we can run the regressions in log form so the coefficient estimates are also elasticities of the 
concerned variables.  
11 See for example, Bahmani-Oskooee, et. al (2002), Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2006), and Narayan 
and Narayan (2007).  
   5 
The estimation procedure comprises of three-steps: (i) An F-Test where the null 
of  no  cointegration  (i.e., 0 4 3 2 1         )  is  tested  against  its  alternative  (i.e., 
0 4 3 2 1         ). Pesaran, et. al. (2001), provide a method of estimating the new 
critical values comprising of a lower bound and an upper bound for large samples, but for 
small samples such as ours, Narayan (2005) provides yet another set of critical values 
that we use: If the calculated F-statistic falls above the upper bound, the null is rejected; 
if it falls below the lower bound the null cannot be rejected; if it falls in-between the 
results  are  inconclusive.  Also  a  negative  and  significant  error-correction  term  would 
indicate cointegration among the underlying variables. See for example, Kremers, et al. 
(1992);  (ii)  Choice  of  Optimal  Lag-Structure.  This  is  necessary  as  the  F-test  results 
depend on the lag-structure of the error-correction model. We accomplish this using the 
Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC);
12 (iii) The Long-run Model which is estimated by 
normalizing the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in each case. Finally, the 
stability of the estimated coefficients is tested using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test 
proposed by Brown et al. (1975).    
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Does a nominal devaluation result in real devaluation? 
  Figure 1 (lower panel) is a plot of detrended values of NEER and REER, 1970-
2006.
13 While the two series tend to move together, there is a marked departure beginning 
around 1998, and since then, the gap has widened. While the NEER kept falling during 
1998 -2004, the REER did not (or at least not as much), perhaps because of the prevailing 
inflation in the country. From 2004 onwards we see the rupee rising in nominal terms, 
and to a lesser extent, in real terms. 
Equation (1) is estimated using annual data on REER and NEER over the 1973-
2006 period, and the results are reported in Table 3. NEER carries a coefficient of 0.24 
which is positive and highly significant. This implies that while a nominal devaluation of 
the rupee does lead to a real devaluation, the impact is less than proportionate - a 1% 
nominal devaluation results in 0.24% real devaluation. 
This may have been because of inflationary pressures stemming from devaluation.  
A negative and significant error correction term in Table 2 further confirms that NEER 
and  REER  are  cointegrated  in  India.  Looking  at  the  coefficient  estimates  of 
NEER i t ln   , one can infer that nominal devaluation has its greatest impact during the 
first  year.  This  is  in  line  with  previous  findings  for  many  LDCs  in  the  literature. 
Interestingly,  the  coefficient  of  the  error-correction  term  is  not  only  larger  (and 
significant)  than  the  same  found  by  Bahmani-Oskooee  and  Miteza  (2002),  but  also 
carries the expected negative sign. Also, the F-test results, reported in Table 1, show 
strong evidence of cointegration between NEER and REER of the rupee. In policy terms, 
it means nominal devaluation of the rupee improves the global competitiveness of Indian 
goods.   
 
                                                 
12 The Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion, being a parsimonious model, was chosen because of the small sample 
size – the sample comprises of 34 observations (annual data over the 1973-2006 period) on each variable.  
13 The series are all detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter (HPF).   6 
Does a real devaluation improve India’s trade balance? 
Trade is an important part of Indian economy, and its relative importance in total 
GDP continues to grow. Perhaps a direct upshot of the economic reforms launched in 
1991, the share of trade in GDP rose from less than 13% in 1990 to almost 35% in 2006. 
Consistent with the economic theory, Figure 2 shows that REER and the trade balance in 
India have moved in opposite direction. Of particular interest is the lower panel in the 
same figure  showing that the above pattern is  not  due to  their trend growth.  The F-
statistic from Table 1, the sign and significance of the error correction term in Table 2, 
and the long-run coefficients of the trade balance equation (i.e., Model 2), all confirm that 
the variables TB, REER, Y, and YF are all cointegrated. The REER carries a (significant) 
coefficient of -1.08. This implies a real devaluation of the rupee helps improve India’s 
trade balance in the long-run. Arora, et al. (2003) arrived at the same conclusion when 
they studied India’s bilateral trade with Australia, Germany, Italy and Japan. In fact, the 
recent surplus in the current account may have been due to the past devaluations of the 
rupee (leading to its real depreciation as well).
14 
  It may also be noted that Y carries a coefficient of -0.72, implying that the recent 
boom in Indian economy likely has an adverse impact on the country’s trade balance. 
This is not surprising considering the unprecedented growth the country is going through. 
A  boom  not  only  enhances  the  country’s  purchasing  power  (and  therefore  increases 
imports),  but  also  calls  for  increased  imports  of  intermediate  inputs.
15  However,  the 
repercussion effect, viz. growth in foreign income (YF) increasing demand for Indian 
goods, seems to have been rather weak. 
The lagged response of trade balance to changes in REER is the strongest in the 
second year. Since the dlREER carries a negative coefficient for both lags, we infer that 
there  is  no  evidence  of  a  J-Curve,  i.e.,  trade  balance  begins  to  improve  right  after 
currency depreciation.  If improving  the trade balance is  the  goal,  then  devaluing the 
rupee is an effective policy option.  
 
Is a real devaluation Expansionary in India? 
  We find that devaluation has been expansionary in  India.  The F-test confirms 
cointegration  amongst  the  variables  LY,  LRG,  LRM,  and  LREER,  justifying  their 
inclusion in our model. The corresponding coefficients all point in one direction -  as far 
as growth is concerned, fiscal policy, monetary policy, and exchange rate policy can all 
be considered effective policy tools.  
   Much of the literature to-date has focused on the short-run. In a theoretical world 
comprising  of  100%  tradables  and  with  perfectly  competitive  markets,  nominal 
                                                 
14 Using the same data set, we find the elasticity of exports and imports with respect to REER to be -1.62 
and  0.35,  respectively.  This  means  Indian  exports  (agricultural  products,  engineering  goods,  precious 
stones, cotton apparel and fabrics, gems and jewelry, handicrafts, tea) are price-elastic; Indian imports are 
not.  This is plausible considering that intermediate inputs (petroleum, machinery and transport equipment, 
electronic goods, edible oils, fertilizers, chemicals, gold, textiles, iron and steel)  figure high in Indian 
imports.  Moreover,  with  the  opening  up  of  the  economy  and  rising  incomes,  there  is  a  surge  in 
consumerism. Imported goods, from cosmetics to luxurious cars, have made their way into the middle and 
upper-income households who do not seem to mind the prices too much.   
15 If the rise in income is due to increased production of import-substitutes, then the country would import 
less, and experience an improvement in her trade balance. This possibility is ruled out as the coefficient is 
negative.   7 
devaluations will lead to  proportionate increases  in  prices  and will have no long-run 
impact on the real exchange rate, with no long-run impact on the output.
16 However, this 
is a rather stringent assumption, especially in developing countries. As shown above, 
nominal devaluation of the Rupee does lead to its real devaluation and therefore, has 
implications for the long-run.   
  The  short-run  dynamics  in  Table  2  are  consistent  with  previous  findings: 
devaluation  may  be  contractionary  in  the  short-run.  See  Kamin  and  Klau  (1997)  for 
example. DLREER carries a positive coefficient of 0.12. However it is insignificant. The 
error correction term is negative and highly significant indicating fast convergence to the 
long-run equilibrium. Figure 3 also confirms this pattern. 
Compared  to  her  imports,  India’s  exports  are  relatively  more  sensitive  to  the 
rupee’s  external  value.
17  Accordingly,  currency  devaluation  boosts  her  trade  balance 
without significantly hurting her imports, including imports of intermediate inputs.    
 
Stability Tests 
   
Figure 4 shows the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics plotted against their break 
points. The coefficients are stable in almost all cases.  
 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Whether currency devaluation helps growth has intrigued economists and policy-
makers alike for the past few decades. In a Keynesian economy with excess capacity, 
devaluation  boosts  net  exports  and  through  the  multiplier  effect,  fosters  the  growth 
process. This channel, however, does not have much empirical support. We make a case 
study of India using latest data, technique, and a relatively uncontroversial model.  
India, especially after 1991 when the reforms were launched, has seen multiple 
devaluations of her currency (the rupee) and has, at the same time, grown tremendously. 
We find that nominal devaluation of the rupee results in its real devaluation, and that a 
real devaluation of the rupee improves India’s trade balance. The recent surplus in current 
account may have been due to past devaluations of the rupee. This follows from the 
above finding, and can potentially resolve the apparent paradox: how come a booming 
economy reports a current account surplus? We believe that the recent boom in Indian 
economy likely has an adverse impact on the country’s trade balance, as may be expected 
but  the  successive  devaluations  of  the  rupee  have  helped  improve  her  trade  balance. 
Currency devaluation is expansionary in India, and can be an effective policy tool. This is 
in contrast to previous studies including Gylfason and Schmid (1983), and Bahmani-
Oskooee  (1998)  who  found  no  long-run  impact.  Although  it  was  a  crisis-induced 
devaluation (at least to begin with), it has been expansionary in India. This may have 
been  because  of  the  major  reforms  introduced  in  1991,  and  a  favorable  productivity 
shock, especially in the information technology (IT) sector, amongst others. 
                                                 
16 Let E=nominal exchange rate of the rupee, say rupees per dollar, such that an increase in E implies a 
nominal devaluation of the rupee. The real exchange rate is defined as EP*/P where P*  is the US price 
level, and P is the domestic price level. As mentioned earlier, as E rises (i.e., the rupee is devalued), P also 
rises. If P rises proportionately, then there will be no change in the real exchange rate. 
17 The estimates, based on the same data set and the theme of another paper, are available upon request.     8 
Appendix 
Data: Definitions, and Sources 
Definitions 
TB = India’s trade balance, defined as her exports over imports. Thus, an increase in this  
         ratio implies an improvement of the trade balance. 
Y = Index of real GDP for India.  
YF = Index of real GDP of Industrial countries together, used as a proxy for the world  
        GDP. 
NEER = Nominal effective exchange rate of the rupee. An increase in NEER implies a  
              nominal appreciation of the rupee.  
REER = Real effective exchange rate of the rupee. An increase in REER implies a real  
             appreciation of the rupee.  
G  = Real Government Expenditure. Nominal expenditure is deflated by the CPI, and  
       then converted into an index.  
M  = Real Money Supply. The M2 aggregate is deflated by the CPI, and then converted  
        into an index.   
All indices are computed with 2000 as the base year. 
Sources 
Annual data spanning over 1973-2006 are employed. Sources include: 
(a) Reserve Bank of India website for data on the nominal and effective exchange 
rates. The indices, based on 36-country trade based weights,  are available at: 
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Handbook%20of%2
0Statistics%20on%20Indian%20Economy 
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Table 1: F-Test Results 
 
Equation  Lag-Structure 
Chosen by SBC 
Calculated Value 
of the F-Statistic 
1a  (5, 5)  32.46 
2a  (3, 2, 5, 3)  11.07 
3a  (3, 0, 2, 1)  8.34 
 
Note: (i, j, k, l) implies the first first-differenced variable  
takes i lags, the second j lags, and so on.   
 
   11 
Table 2: Coefficient Estimates of Exchange Rate and Error Correction Term Based on Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion 
 
Model  Dependent 
Variable  DLREER  DLREER1  DLNEER  DLNEER1  DLNEER2  DLNEER3  DLNEER4  EC(-1) 












2  DLTB  -0.15 
(0.56) 
-0.87 
(3.09)  -  -  -  -  -  -0.85 
(5.27) 
3  DLY  0.12 













LNEER  LRG  LRM   LREER  LY   YF 
1  LREER  -  0.24 
(3.54)  -  -  -  -  - 
2  LTB  3.77 






3  LY  3.09 





(5.11)  -  - 
 
Note: DLREER = ln REERt– ln REERt-1 , DLREER1 = ln REERt-1– ln REERt-2 , and so on. Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic. Bold 
face denotes significance at 5% level. A dash (-) indicates the model did not include the concerned variable.  
 

































































Figure 2. Real Effective Exchange Rate and Trade Balance 
































































































































Figure 3. Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) and Real GDP (Y) 
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